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Abstract
Previous studies have established that firms' effectiveness can differ based on the differences among directors
within a board, and between boards. However, studies have yet to establish the effectiveness of the diverse
attributes of the board on firms' quality of earnings in an emerging market setting such as Vietnam. This study
investigates the effect of board diversity on earnings quality in a sample of Vietnamese listed firms. The two
dimensions of board diversity measures in this study cover a wide range of structural and demographic
attributes of board of directors, using a diversity-of-boards index (dissimilarities among firm boards, i.e., board
structure) and a diversity-in-boards index (dissimilarities among directors within a board, i.e., demographic
attributes of board members). Earnings quality is an aggregate measure compiled from four accounting-based
measures of earnings quality: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings
smoothness. We find a significant, positive linear relationship between diversity of boards and earnings
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Previous studies have established that firms’ effectiveness can 
differ based on the differences among directors within a board, 
and between boards. However, studies have yet to establish the 
effectiveness of the diverse attributes of the board on firms’ 
quality of earnings in an emerging market setting such as 
Vietnam. This study investigates the effect of board diversity 
on earnings quality in a sample of Vietnamese listed firms. The 
two dimensions of board diversity measures in this study cover 
a wide range of structural and demographic attributes of board 
of directors, using a diversity-of-boards index (dissimilarities 
among firm boards, i.e., board structure) and a diversity-in-
boards index (dissimilarities among directors within a board, 
i.e., demographic attributes of board members). Earnings 
quality is an aggregate measure compiled from four 
accounting-based measures of earnings quality: accruals 
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quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and 
earnings smoothness. We find a significant and positive 
relationship between diversity-of-boards and earnings quality; 
while the relationship between diversity-in-boards and earnings 
quality represents a non-linear U-shaped curve.  
 
Key words: board of directors, diversity-of-boards, diversity-
in-boards, earnings quality, Vietnam. 
 
JEL classification: G3, M1, M4, J1 
Summary at a glance 
This study investigates the impact of board diversity and 
earnings quality with a sample of Vietnamese listed firms. We 
find a significant and positive relationship between diversity-
of-boards (dissimilarities among firm boards) and earnings 
quality; while the relationship between diversity-in-boards 
(dissimilarities among directors within a board) and earnings 










The board of directors forms one of the cornerstones of 
corporate frameworks. The organization, structure, quality and 
operation of the board of directors determine many aspects of a 
firm. Several scholars have examined the implications of board 
diversity in relation to organizational outcomes, although the 
meaning of board diversity has not been explicitly defined 
(Harrison and Klein 2007). Most of the literature examines the 
individual attributes of the demographic diversity among 
directors within a board (such as gender diversity, age 
diversity, nationality diversity) and/or the structural attributes 
of board of directors, such as the chairperson also being the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), board independence, director 
ownership in relation to organizational outcomes, rather than 
their combined attributes. A few studies have attempted to 
combine the demographic or structural dimensions of board of 
directors into a single examination to formulate a complete 
picture of demographic as well as structural diversity (see Ben-
Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and Turgut 2013). 
This paper employs two dimensions of board diversity 
(Hafsi and Turgut 2013) to investigate the impact of board 
diversity on the earnings quality of Vietnamese listed firms. 
The two dimensions of board diversity are measured by a 
diversity-of-boards index (dissimilarities among firm boards, a 
dimension which relates to board structure) and a diversity-in-
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boards index (dissimilarities among directors within a board, 
which relates to demographic attributes of board members). 
However, we extend Hafsi and Turgut’s (2013) indices in two 
ways. First, we use a refined measure of variables about 
diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-boards applicable to 
Vietnam, an emerging market. Prior researchers have 
concluded that governance structures are likely to develop 
endogenously, depending on specific characteristics of the firm 
and the unique business environment in a particular country 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). 
Second, unlike Hafsi and Turgut (2013), who combined 
several attributes into a single index with equal weights to 
construct diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards indices, 
which may produce unexpected drawbacks (Ben-Amar et al. 
2013), we apply both weighted and unweighted methods to 
measure diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-boards indices. A 
survey questionnaire provides executives’ perceptions about 
various attributes relating to board diversity to determine their 
importance. A comparison of our results between weighted and 
unweighted methods allows us to investigate the potential 
impact of the perceived importance of attributes relating to the 
diversity-in-boards and diversity-of-boards and their impact on 
earnings quality.  





Board diversity is presented as both fiduciary and advisory in 
nature (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Labelle et al. 2010). Both roles 
may affect the quality of earnings in different manners. From 
the fiduciary perspective, board of directors have to be less 
dependent on each other and even specialists in monitoring 
shareholders’ interests. This is as stipulated in the current 
regulation and generally accepted governance principles. 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) predicts 
management interests are different and even in conflict with 
those of shareholders. According to the agency theory, 
diversity-of-boards can be used to establish better monitoring 
and control mechanisms. It is based on the assumption that 
directors with their own sets of rationalities can contribute with 
different styles of controlling and monitoring the management 
appropriate to the firm. The diverse fiduciary perspectives 
resulting from the board members can become effective in 
developing a sound controlling and monitoring mechanism. 
Therefore, it is argued here that the diversity-of-boards directly 
contributes to increasing the earnings quality of firms. 
From the advisory perspective of governance, board 
effectiveness requires a diversity of knowledge, competencies, 
and organizational values to guide and contribute to 
organizational learning and strategic decision making. The 
emphasis here is on counselling and mentoring the 
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management, and not on the statutory characteristics such as 
the diversity of interests or the financial literacy of the 
directors. The idea that board diversity affects firm 
performance has roots in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). Resource dependence theorists have 
specifically argued that the combining diverse stakeholder 
perspectives in board decision-making, improves firms’ ability 
to obtain resources critical to their functioning (Davis and Cobb 
2010; Pfeffer 1973). Diversity is necessary for board members 
to be able to ask knowledgeable questions to shape the 
managerial decision-making process and the organizational 
culture. According to Reidenbach and Robin (1991), the moral 
development of a firm is determined by the firm’s culture and 
in a reciprocal fashion. By questioning, criticizing, advising, 
and counselling, diversity-in-board enhances the degree of 
moral or ethical development of a firm (Labelle et al. 2010), 
and thus is likely to improve the earnings quality of a firm. 
Hypotheses development 
Diversity-of-boards and earnings quality.  
A large body of literature has examined the relationship 
between structural attributes of board of directors relating to the 
diversity-of-boards and earnings quality (Klein 2002; Park and 
Shin 2004; Rahman and Ali 2006). These structural attributes 
are identified to represent recommended ‘best practice’ 
governance. However, most of the literature focuses on specific 
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attributes, rather than their combined attributes, and the 
findings from those studies are inconclusive. 
In this study, diversity-of-boards is an index-driven variable 
based on four structural attributes of board of directors: 
CEO/chair separation, non-executive directors
1
 owning more 
than five per cent of a firm’s equity (blockholders), 
representative directors’ ownership and promoters. The term 
‘representative directors’ refers to a director representing the 
interest of the appointing party (such as government). We 
examined the role of representative directors in the board of 
directors because 97 of the firms in the sample (representing 
65%) had representative directors. 
(i) CEO/chair separation. The Code of Corporate Governance in 
Vietnam mandates the separation of the role of chairperson of 
the board of directors and CEO in a listed firm. However, a 
person occupying a dual role is allowed if shareholders approve 
it at general meetings. The separation of the board’s CEO and 
chairperson results in reduced agency problems because it 
allows more independence of the board from management for 
decision making (Donaldson and Davis 1991; Jackling and Johl 
2009; Jensen 1993). Prior studies suggest that the separation of 
chairperson from CEO is an important element in preventing 




(ii) Non-executive directors owning more than five per cent of a 
firm’s equity (blockholders). Prior research suggests that non-
executive directors who also hold blocks of shares in a firm can 
reduce agency costs (Agrawal and Nasser 2011, 2012). A board 
seat provides the monitoring function over managers, and the 
block shareholdings provide ownership interest. This 
combination can produce a greater propensity to align 
managerial self-interests with shareholder self-interests. Thus, a 
non-executive director who is also a blockholder can play a 
more forceful governance role (Agrawal and Nasser 2012). 
From an agency point of view, board members are assumed to 
be more alert if they have equity involvement (Sonnenfeld 
2002). 
(iii) Representative directors’ ownership. Most Vietnamese 
listed firms have been transformed from traditional state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) into listed status, but the ownership of these 
firms is still heavily concentrated in the hands of large state-
owned shareholders (Vu et al. 2011). Instead of having 
government bureaucrats directly supervising the SOEs as 
before, the state now formally exercises its rights as a major 
shareholder by appointing representative directors to boards. 
From an agency theory perspective, directors’ level of 
shareholding, both of individual and representative stocks, is 
seen as an incentive to reduce agency costs. 
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(iv) Promoters. Following Jayati, Subrata and Kaustav (2008), 
we define promoters as controlling shareholders (i.e., the 
government in our study) who also serve as inside directors on 
the board. In India, family-owned corporations are common 
(Jayati et al. 2008); while the Vietnamese government still 
retains a substantial amount of ownership in many listed firms, 
especially those deemed to be large and strategically important 
to the nation (Carlin and Pham 2009). In order to monitor these 
listed firms, the government appoints representatives on the 
board of directors. Previous studies have shown that the 
protection of state-owned listed firms by the government 
reduces the incentives for managers to manipulate firm-specific 
information (Ding et al. 2007; Wang and Yung 2011). In 
Vietnam, outside directors may serve as representative directors 
for the government to carry out its duty, but this is relatively 
ineffective compared to inside directors who also serve as 
representative directors for government (Representative News, 
2012). This is because the outside directors of many firms 
know little of the firms they represent; hence they fail to fulfill 
their role. Previous studies also show that it can be good to 
have a number of inside directors on the board as they may be 
very candid and well-informed (Baysinger and Butler 1985; 
Sonnenfeld 2002). Agency theory states that a firm’s top 
management becomes more powerful when the board of 
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directors is composed of people who know little of the firm 
(Mulili and Wong 2011). 
Combining the structural characteristics of board of 
directors relating to diversity between boards into a composite 
measure gives a comprehensive picture of their simultaneous 
influence on various organizational outcomes (Ben-Amar et al. 
2013; Hafsi and Turgut 2013). Based on the propositions of the 
agency theory, structural attributes of the board of directors are 
designed to control agency conflict by demanding more 
conservatism. Directors are then likely to know early about any 
future losses. Such early information allows directors to control 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour. Based on this discussion, 
this states the first hypothesis as follows. 
H1: Diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality. 
Diversity-in-boards and earnings quality. Earlier studies have 
analyzed the relationship between demographic diversity 
among directors and organizational financial performance, 
rather than earnings quality, and the published evidence 
remains focused on developed economies (Mahadeo et al. 
2012).  
In this study diversity-in-boards is an index-driven variable 
based on the following four attributes of directors sourced from 
the literature: gender, age, education degree and nationality. 
These are among several other demographic attributes 
examined in the literature, and are often mentioned in isolation 
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but rarely together (Erhardt et al. 2003; Kang et al. 2007; Post 
et al. 2011).  
(i) Director gender. The main board diversity characteristic in the 
examined prior studies is gender diversity. Recently, 
researchers have begun to examine the relationship between 
gender diversity and earnings quality, and they document that 
the presence of women on the boards leads to better board 
dynamics and improved reported earnings quality (Adams and 
Ferreira 2009; Francis et al. 2009; Srinidhi et al. 2011). 
However, these findings focus on the US. Meanwhile, Ye, 
Zhang and Rezaee’s (2010) study in China as well as Hili and 
Affes’s (2012) study in France do not show a significant 
relationship.  
(ii) Director age. Directors’ age reflects their business 
experience and is evidence of their maturity in company 
management (Kang et al. 2007). Prior studies point out that 
older members exhibit more conservative and moral judgment 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984; McCabe et al. 2006). Due to the 
greater conservatism of older members, it is expected that 
boards with older directors will have higher reported earnings 
quality. However, this tendency is changing, and there is an 
active promotion of age diversity in order to encourage the 
varying perspectives of different age groups, and as an integral 




(iii) Director education degree. Director education degree is 
viewed as an indicator of directors’ knowledge, cognitive 
orientation and skill base (Hambrick and Mason 1984). 
Previous research documents that a high level of education 
among directors on boards results in a greater ability to adopt 
new ideas, accept innovations (Guthrie et al. 1991; Wally and 
Baum 1994) and offers a broader view and larger breadth of 
understanding (Post et al. 2011). More diverse boards possess 
more diverse knowledge bases, as well as the perspectives 
necessary to develop and evaluate solutions to complex 
problems (Milliken and Martins 1996; Van der Walt et al. 
2006). 
(iv) Director nationality. With increasing globalization, firms 
tend to modify their governance structures by having more 
foreigners on their boards (Carpenter 1998; Oxelheim et al. 
2013). Milliken and Martins (1996) suggest that diversity in 
national background may have a negative influence on process 
effectiveness and performance in the beginning, but after a 
while, more efficient processes and higher performance seem to 
occur. Vietnam’s reform policy from 1986 incorporated trade 
liberalization for direct foreign investment and provided 
incentives to attract more foreign investment. Heijltjes, Olie 
and Glunk (2003) suggest that if the home country is small, 
there is a need to grow internationally, and thus the board 
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should be international as well. Being a small and new 
emerging country, Vietnam is a good case study. 
Directors’ heterogeneous attributes are likely to bring in 
different perspectives for discussion and making decisions of 
the board. The propositions of the resource dependence theory 
suggest that increased questioning, criticizing, advising, and 
counselling, associated with diversity-in-board  can enhance the 
degree of moral or ethical development of a firm (Labelle et al. 
2010). Based on the preceding discussion of the existing 
literature and resource dependence theory, the second 
hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H2: Diversity-in-boards improves earnings quality. 
Research methods 
The sample 
Our sample consists of all Vietnamese listed firms for which 
the required data items are available, except for those in banks 
and financial institutions because their financial statements are 
prepared in accordance with their special regulatory 
environment.  
This study measures individual earnings quality using 5-year 
rolling windows
2
 from 2006 to 2010 to generate the 2010 
earnings quality measures of the sample, similar to Francis et 
al. (2008). Accruals quality is one of four earnings quality 
measures in this study. Due to estimating this measure requires 
lagged and forward data, it generates the 2010 earnings 
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attributes measures of the sample by using the financial 
statement data items for seven years from the fiscal years 2005 
to 2011.  
The financial statement data items were extracted by hand 
from Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (HOSE)’s website 
(www.hsx.vn) and Hanoi stock exchange (HNX)’s website 
(www.hnx.vn) because there were no electronic databases of 
financial, statistical and market information on Vietnamese 
listed firms. To include in the sample, each firm must have an 
income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement for 
all seven fiscal years. This is a perfectly balanced panel with 
each firm having the same number of observations. 
The raw data for calculation of board diversity indices in 
this study is hand-collected from the 2010 annual reports and 
firm websites. Our final sample, with all required data 
available, includes 150 firms. 
Earnings quality measures 
The literature widely uses two types of earnings quality 
measure: accounting-based measures and market-based 
measures. A fundamental assumption underlying the market-
based measure is that the markets efficiently incorporate 
accounting information. We choose accounting-based measures 
because the Vietnamese market is new and semi-efficient (Phan 
and Zhou 2014; Truong et al. 2008). Additionally, managers 
are likely to manipulate accounting-based measures, while it is 
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much harder to manipulate market-based measures (Prior et al. 
2008).  
This study constructs a standardised aggregate earnings 
quality score as a proxy for earnings quality in the main 
analyses
3
, based on four accounting measures which have been 
used in prior studies (Boonlert-U-Thai et al. 2006; Francis et al. 
2004). They are accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability and earnings smoothness. Prior studies have used 
a standardised aggregate earnings quality/management score as 
a proxy for earnings quality/management (see Gaio and Raposo 
2011; Leuz et al. 2003). Additionally, factor analysis suggests 
that a single standardised aggregate measure of earnings quality 
which represents four earnings attribute measures in this study 
is valid (more details of factor analysis is in Findings Section). 
Accruals quality. Accruals quality (AQ) in this study is based 
on the widely used Dechow and Dichev (2002) statistical 
calculation technique, where it is measured by relating total 
current accruals to cash flows from operations. AQ is the 
standard deviation of residuals (εj) from the following 
regression: 
TCAj,t = φ0 + φ1CFOj,t-1 + φ2CFOj,t + φ3CFOj,t+1 + εj,t  (1) 
Where TCAj,t = firm j’s total current accruals in year t (ΔCAj,t - 
ΔCLj,t – ΔCashj,t + ΔSTDEBTj,t); CFOj,t = firm j’s cash flow 
from operations in year t; ΔCAj,t = firm j’s change in current 
assets between year t-1 and year t; ΔCLj,t = firm j’s change in 
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current liabilities between year t-1 and year t; ΔCashj,t = firm 
j’s change in cash between year t-1 and year t; and ΔSTDEBTj,t 
= firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 
and year t. All variables in equation (1) are deflated by firm j’s 
total assets in year t-1. Larger values of AQ indicate less 
earnings quality. 
Earnings Persistence. Earnings persistence (PERSIS) is the 
extent to which current period earnings reflect future period 
earnings. We follow Francis et al. (2004) and measure PERSIS 
as the negative of the slope coefficient estimate, ϕ1,j, from the 
following model:  
Earnj,t = ϕ0,j + ϕ1,jEarnj,t-1 + ѵj,t    (2) 
Where Earnj,t = firm’s j net income before extraordinary items 
in year t. All variables in equation (2) are deflated by firm j’s 
total assets in year t-1. Larger values (i.e., less negative) of 
PERSIS indicate less earnings quality. 
Earnings predictability. Earnings predictability (PREDICT) is 
the ability of earnings to predict itself (Lipe 1990). Our 
measure of PREDICT is the standard deviation of the residuals 
(ѵj) from equation (2), following Francis et al. (2004). Larger 
values of PREDICT imply less earnings quality. 
Earnings smoothness. This study adopts the measure of 
earnings smoothness (SMOOTH) in Francis et al. (2004) as the 
ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by beginning total assets, to its 
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standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by 
beginning total assets. Larger values of SMOOTH imply less 
earnings quality. 
The aggregate earnings quality score. Based on the four 
individual earnings quality measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, 
SMOOTH), we construct a standardised aggregate earnings 
quality score and use it to draw the conclusion of the impact of 
board diversity on earnings quality. The larger the value of the 
individual earnings quality measure, the lower the earnings 
quality. Following Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), we rank 
the four individual earnings quality values in descending order, 
so that a higher ranked value now represents higher earnings 
quality. The standardised aggregate earnings quality score of a 
firm is computed by averaging the firm rankings for the four 
individual earnings quality measures. 
Board diversity measures 
Four board diversity indices are constructed in this study to 
measure board diversity: unweighted diversity-of-boards index 
(UW_DoB), unweighted diversity-in-boards index (UW_DiB), 
weighted diversity-of-boards index (W_DoB) and weighted 
diversity-in-boards index (W_DiB). 
Unweighted diversity-of-boards index. As noted earlier, we 
include four structural attributes of board of directors to 
construct the diversity-of-boards indices. These are measured 
as shown in Table 1. 
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< Insert Table 1 about here> 
In order to construct UW_DoB, we use the inter-sample 
distance-measurement method (Hafsi and Turgut 2013) which 
measures the structural dissimilarity among firm boards. This 
method shows the degree of dissimilarity of all four structural 
attributes of board of directors in a given firm board, from 
those in other firm boards in the sample. We construct a matrix 
by first measuring the dissimilarity between a given firm and 
another firm in regard to all structural attributes of board of 
directors (i.e., four attributes in this study) simultaneously. 
Next, we measure such dissimilarity for all other firms. Then, 
we take the average of the dissimilarity between a given firm 
and the remaining firms in the sample as UW_DoB of the given 
firm. Similarly, we measure UW_DoB for other firms. 
Consequently, we discovered how dissimilar (or diverse) a firm 
is from the remaining firms in the sample. 
Because the data types of structural attributes of a board of 
directors in this study are different (i.e., binary and ratio scale 
types), following Han and Kamber (2006), we applied a new 
approach to process all different data types together. The 
technique combines the different attributes into a single 
dissimilarity matrix, bringing all attributes of interest onto a 
common scale of the interval [0, 1]. A higher scale represents 




Unweighted diversity-in-boards indices. Table 1 describes the 
measurement of four demographic attributes of board of 
directors in detail. Because the intent here is to measure how 
diverse demographic attributes are within a board (gender, age, 
education degree and nationality), each of these attributes is 
measured using the modified Blau’s index (1977). This index 
has been suggested as an optimal measure of diversity to 
capture variations within a group of people (Harrison and Klein 
2007). 
Director age is classified into six subgroupings: under 36 
years, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, 66–75 and over 76, following 
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen and Hanuman (2012). We choose this 
classification because Mahadeo et al.’s (2012) study also 
examines an emerging economy (Mauritius). Because there is 
no directors over 76 in our sample firms, this subgrouping is 
dropped from the classification of director age. 
After identifying classifications within each of these 
demographic attributes, we employed Blau’s index to measure 
how diverse were the four attributes within a board above. 
Blau’s index was calculated by the following formula: 
 21 ( )kp  (3) 
Where variety can take k = 1, …, K possible categories, and p 
represents the proportion of members of board of directors in 
the k
th
 category. When Blau’s index gains a large value, 
diversity-in-boards increases. However, in order to get a 
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standardised range from zero to unity for all demographic 
diversity attributes, we use the method introduced by Agresti 
and Agresti (1978). This method multiplies Blau’s index by 
K/(K-1), called the modified Blau’s index. Then, to construct 
the UW_DiB, we split the sample into terciles for each attribute 
to rank diversity levels (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and 
Turgut 2013). These groups then take values of zero for the 
first tercile, one for the second and two for the third. Finally, 
UW_DiB is the sum of all ranked attributes that are involved in 
demographic diversity within a board for each firm. A higher 
value represents higher diversity-in-boards. 
Weighted diversity-of-boards and weighted diversity-in-boards 
indices. We construct W_DoB and W_DiB similar to 
UW_DoB and UW_DiB, but each attribute of board of 
directors is weighted based on executives’ perceptions to weigh 
their importance (Dess and Davis 1984). Specifically, we 
conduct a survey to examine executives’ perceptions of the 
relevance of board of directors’ attributes on earnings quality of 
Vietnamese listed firms.
4
 Corporate executives of Vietnamese 
listed firms experientially know the mindset of the board of 
directors towards the quality of earnings; hence we request that 
executives assign weighting to each attribute of board of 
directors which impacts on earnings quality of Vietnamese 
listed firms. Each attribute is assigned a weight ranging from 0 
(unimportant) to 10 (most important). This wide scale increase 
21 
 
the variance obtained and to make the results more reliable 
(Hartley and Betts 2010). The questionnaire was sent to 150 
executives of all the firms in the sample. A total of 80 usable 
replies were received which represented a response rate of 
53.33%. 
In order to measure W_DoB, we calculate  ( )fij in Equation 
(7) (see the Appendix) with each attribute to construct the 













  (4) 
where  ( )fij is the indicator of attributes f weighted; p is the 
number of attributes f; and MEANRATING is the mean 
importance rating of each attribute f. Then we use equation (7) 
with  ( )fij  modified to measure W_DoB of each firm board. 
Turning to W_DiB, based on the mean importance rating of 
each attribute from the questionnaire survey, we calculated 
W_DiB as the sum of all the ranked attributes (out of four) used 
to construct the diversity-in-boards index in this study, with 
each ranked attribute being a multiple of its mean importance 
rating. A higher value represents higher diversity-in-boards. 
Control variables. We control for several variables that are 
described as ‘innate determinants’ in prior research where they 
are found to be related to earnings quality (Francis et al. 2005). 
These control variables are referred to as innate determinants 
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because they are less likely to change in the short run. They 
include firm size (SIZE), length of operating cycle (LOG.OC), 
cash flow variability (STD.CFO), sales variability 
(STD.SALES), and incidence of net loss realizations (LOSS). 
All variables are measured over rolling five-year periods, 
consistent with the measures of earnings quality. SIZE is 
computed as log of the firm’s average total assets. LOG.OC is 
measured as the log of the sum of the firm’s days account 
receivable and days inventory. STD.CFO is calculated as the 
standard deviation of the firm’s cash flows from operations, 
scaled by total assets. STD.SALES is measured as the standard 
deviation of the firm’s sales revenues, scaled by total assets. 
LOSS is computed as the number of years where the firm 
reported loss over previous five years. Because the government 
still holds a large proportion of ownership in many Vietnamese 
listed firms (Vu et al. 2011) and studies using the sample in 
China (Ding et al. 2007; Wang and Yung 2011) show that state 
ownership is related to earnings quality, we also use the state 
ownership (STATE), measured by the percentage of 
shareholding owned by the state, as a control variable in this 
study.  
The impact of board diversity on earnings quality 
We tested hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the effects of board 
diversity on earnings quality, using an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimator. The regression functions are: 
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      0 1 , vari i j i i iEQ DoB control iables                  (5) 
      0 1 , vari i j i i iEQ DiB control iables                   
(6) 
where EQi = firm i’s the stadardised aggregate earnings quality 
score, calculated as the average rank across the four individual 
measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH); DoBi = firm 
i’s indices (unweighted and weighted) of diversity-of-boards; 




Table 2 shows a statistical description of the mean score of 80 
executives’ perception about attributes. The scores vary 
between 4.3 and 8.5 within a possible score range between zero 
and 10. Respondents considered the Promoters attribute (i.e., 
the percentage of executive directors who also serve as 
representative directors on the board) as the most important 
board of directors attribute towards maintaining firms earnings 
quality. Its mean score was 8.5. Respondents considered other 
structural attributes of board of directors were also important. 
Their responses show that structural attributes are more 
important than the demographic attributes of board of directors 
in the relationship with earnings quality. Among the 
demographic attributes, respondents rated the directors’ gender 
as the least important, with a mean of 4.3. 
< Insert Table 2 about here> 
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Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. The sample mean 
value of EQ is 75.5. A higher EQ implies a higher level of 
earnings quality. The AQ measure has a mean value of 0.06. As 
a benchmark, Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) report mean values  
of 0.065 in Singapore (1302 firm-year observations), 0.061 in 
Thailand (1357 firm-year observations) over 1996-2002. 
PERSIS, which captures (the negative of) the extent to which 
an earnings innovation remains in the series, has a mean value 
of -0.44. This value is roughly similar to values reported by 
Francis et al. (2004) for an average of 1,471 firms per year over 
1975-2001 in the U.S. that reported a mean value of -0.482. 
PREDICT has a mean value of 0.07.  As  a benchmark, 
Boonlert-U-Thai et al. (2006) reported mean values  of 0.074 in 
Singapore (1302 firm-year observations), and 0.074 in Thailand  
(1357 firm-year observations) over 1996-2002. Finally, 
SMOOTH, which captures the variability of income relative to 
the variability of cash flows, had a mean value of 0.49. In 
comparison, Hunt et al. (2000) reported  a mean ratio of income 
volatility to cash volatility of 0.51 (11,976 firm-year 
observations) over the 1986-1994 sample.  
< Insert Table 3 about here> 
As shown in Table 3, UW_DoB has a range between 0.23 
and 0.49, and W_DoB has a range of 0.23 and 0.51. The mean 
value is 0.31 for both variables. This range indicates that the 
structure of board of directors among firms in the sample is 
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with and without assigning weights to the attributes 
constituting diversity-of-boards. The range for UW_DiB is 
between zero and 7, and its mean value is 2.91. The range for 
W_DiB is between zero and 41.2 and its mean value is 16.11. 
The means values of UW_DiB and W_DiB indicate that 
diversity-in-boards in the sample is quite low. Despite 
substantial efforts to privatize, the average state ownership 
(STATE) in the Vietnamese sample is 27.61 per cent, with the 
highest state ownership is 79.07 per cent. 
 Table 4 reports the pairwise correlation for all variables 
examined in this study. Four individual earnings quality 
measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH) are highly 
correlated with the coefficients more than 0.3, suggesting 
reasonable factorability (Hair 1998). Additionally, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.76 for the 
overall test and more than 0.7 for each earnings attribute 
measure (not tabulated), above the commonly recommended 
value of greater than 0.5 (Hair 1998). The Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity is significant (χ
2
 (6) = 257.77, p < 0.000) (not 
tabulated). Adopting the ‘eigenvalue-greater-than one rule’ 
(Hair 1998), this study reduces the number of factors to one 
because there is only one factor with eigenvalue of 2.62 (not 
tabulated). Factor analysis suggests that a single factor 
represents these four earnings attribute measures, and they 
accounted for 65.53 per cent of the total variance, above the 
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criterion of 60 per cent (Hair 1998). Hence, it is proper to 
combine the four earnings attributes measures into a single 
standardised aggregate measure of earnings quality. This 
approach is similar to Leuz et al. (2003) who used factor 
analysis to clarify the combination of four individual earnings 
management measures into a standardised aggregate earnings 
management score. 
< Insert Table 4 about here> 
Interestingly, as shown in Table 4, UW_DoB and W_DoB 
are significantly and positively correlated (r = 0.987). 
Similarly, UW_DiB is significantly and positively correlated 
with W_DiB (r = 0.986). These results suggest that weighted 
board diversity indices built based on executives’ perceptions is 
similar to unweighted board diversity indices. Table 4 also 
shows that the two measures of UW_DoB and W_DoB are 
positively correlated with EQ as expected, while both UW_DiB 
and W_DiB show no significant correlations. 
Regression analyses 
We checked the variance inflation factor (VIF) for our 
regression models. The maximum VIF is 1.37, which is less 
than 10 for all the regression models. Thus, the 
multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem for our test 
models (Gujarati and Porter 2009). To avoid the problem of 
heteroskedasticity, OLS regression with heteroskedasticity 
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robust standard errors (White 1980) was used to test the 
relationships implicit in equations (5) and (6). 
Table 5 reports the results of the regression analyses using 
an aggregate earnings quality score (i.e., EQ) as the dependent 
variable; and UW_DoB, W_DoB, UW_DiB, W_DiB 
alternately as the independent variables. As shown in the table, 
the coefficient estimate of both UW_DoB and W_DoB are 
positive and significant (p-values of 0.055 and 0.040 
respectively). Because higher aggregate earnings quality scores 
imply higher earnings quality, this result suggests that 
diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality, confirming 
Hypothesis 1 (i.e. diversity-of-boards improves earnings 
quality). Meanwhile, both UW_DiB and W_DiB (p-values of 
0.256 and 0.274 respectively) are not significantly related to 
EQ, which rejects Hypothesis 2 (i.e. diversity-in-boards 
improves earnings quality). 
< Insert Table 5 about here> 
The results for control variables shown in Table 5 indicate a 
significant negative association between EQ and LOSS, which 
suggests that firms with more negative income during five 
years are associated with lower earnings quality, consistent 
with prior studies (Srinidhi et al. 2011; Wang and Yung 2011). 
STD.SALES and LOG.OC show positive and significant 
coefficients. SIZE and STD.CFO are not significant. 
Interestingly, the coefficients of STATEOWN are significantly 
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positive with EQ, indicating that state ownership plays a 
significant role in inducing better earnings quality. This finding 
is consistent with the findings of Wang and Yung (2011), who 
investigated the impact of state ownership on earnings 
management of Chinese listed firms.  
There are several possible reasons for the finding of no 
relationships between diversity-in-boards and earnings quality. 
First, as shown in previous studies (Hili and Affes 2012; Ye et 
al. 2010), the demographic diversity attribute (gender diversity) 
does not have an effect on earnings quality. Additionally, based 
on the resource dependence theory, demographic differences 
between board members within a board (diversity-in-boards) 
are seen as a key resource that influences the strategy-making 
process (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In 
so doing, diversity-in-boards may only indirectly influence 
earnings quality. In contrast, diversity-of-boards is connected to 
structural factors, representing recommended governance ‘best 
practices’. Diversity-of-boards helps to ensure that managers 
duly represent the strategic processes agreed by the board of 
directors, and protect all shareholders’ interests (Fama 1980; 
Fama and Jensen 1983). Therefore, diversity-of-boards 
improves earnings quality. 
Additional analysis and robustness tests 
Nonlinearity and board diversity 
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Ben-Amar et al. (2013) document a U-shaped relationship 
between the demographic diversity of board of directors, 
measured by a demographic diversity index, and merger and 
acquisition performance. Therefore, we added the square of 
UW_DoB, W_DoB, UW_DiB and W_DiB to the models in 
Table 5 to test whether there was a U-shaped relationship 
between board diversity (both diversity-of-boards and 
diversity-in-boards) and earnings quality.  
The results reported in Table 6 indicate that diversity-of-
boards indices (both unweighted and weighted) and their 
squared values are not statistically related to the aggregate 
earnings quality score. This suggests that a linear specification 
is adequate in capturing the relationship between diversity-of-
boards and earnings quality, as far as our sample is concerned. 
Meanwhile, the diversity-in-boards indices (both unweighted 
and weighted) and their squared values are statistically 
significant (p-values of 0.017 and 0.040 for UW_DiB and 
UW_DiB
2
 respectively, and 0.023 and 0.043 for W_DiB and 
W_DiB
2
 respectively). The coefficients of diversity-in-boards 
indices (both unweighted and weighted) are negative and 
statistically significant; whereas the coefficients of their 
squared values are positive and significant, which is consistent 
with a U-shaped curve. These results are consistent those of 
Ben-Amar et al. (2013), who examined the relationship 
between the board of directors’ diversity configurations and 
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merger and acquisition performance and found that 
demographic diversity had a clear and non-linear effect with a 
U-shaped curve on merger and acquisition performance, but 
that statutory diversity had no statistically significant influence. 
< Insert Table 6 about here> 
Given the estimated values for the UW_DiB and UW_DiB
2
 
coefficients, the turning point of the relationship between 
diversity-in-boards (unweighted index) and earnings quality is:
5
 
Minimization point = ˗ coefficient of UW_DiB/2*coefficient of 
UW_DiB
2
 = ˗ (˗8.97)/2 × 1.18 ≈ 4. 
These results suggest that as diversity-in-boards on the 
board of directors increases, the sample firms engage in a 
negative effect on earnings quality. This is probably because 
the benefits of demographic diversity are counterbalanced by 
problems related to integration difficulties (Ben-Amar et al. 
2013). However, when UW_DiB is beyond 4, diversity-in-
boards improves the quality of earnings.  
Measuring the aggregate earnings quality score excluding the 
accruals quality measure 
Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accruals model is used as a 
measure of earnings attribute in the present study, but 
according to Wysocki (2006), Dechow and Dichev model does 
not comprehensively capture a firm’s earnings quality. More 
specifically, Wysocki find that current cash flows are 
simultaneously significantly and negatively related to current 
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accruals. Gaio and Raposo (2011) that use Dechow and Dichev 
accruals model also mention this issue as a limitation of their 
aggregate earnings quality measure. To test the validity of the 
results (whether the accruals quality measure using Dechow 
and Dichev’s (2002) model significantly impacts on the 
standardised aggregate  earnings quality score in the present 
study, this study measured the standardised aggregate  earnings 
quality score by excluding the accruals quality measure. The 
standardised aggregate earnings quality score is computed by 
averaging the firm rankings for the three individual earnings 
quality measures (i.e., PERSIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH). The 
results (not tabulated) are similar to those in Tables 5 and 6.  
The impact of board diversity on individual earnings 
attributes 
To check the robustness of the positive relationship between 
diversity-of-boards and earnings quality, and the non-linear 
relationship between diversity-in-boards and earnings quality, 
similar regression models as in Tables 5 and 6, are run with 
replacing the standardised aggregate  earnings quality score by 
four individual earnings attribute variables (AQ, PERSIS, 
PREDICT, and SMOOTH) respectively. Given almost identical 
results are obtained by using either unweighted or weighted 
index, and for brevity, this study report results using weighted 
indices of board diversity only.  
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Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of the regression 
analyses using each earnings quality measure (i.e., AQ, 
PERSIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH) as the dependent variable and 
W_DoB as the independent variable. Results show that 
W_DoB is significantly related to all four earnings attribute 
measures. The coefficient estimates of W_DoB are negative 
and significant at the 0.10 level or better in these regressions 
where AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH alternately are 
the dependent variables. The results in Panel A of Table 7 
indicate that diversity-of-boards improves earnings quality 
(considered individually). It is similar to the main findings from 
the impact of diversity-of-boards on the standardised aggregate 
earnings quality score. 
< Insert Table 7 about here> 
As reported in Panel B of Table 7, the coefficients of W_DiB 
were still not significant. These results, therefore confirm the 
initial evidence that diversity-in-boards is not related to 
earnings quality. Interestingly, Panel C of Table 7 shows that 
there is a non-linear relationship between diversity-in-boards 
and AQ as well as between diversity-in-boards and PREDICT. 
The coefficients of W_DiB are positive and statistically 
significant; whereas the coefficients of their quadratic terms are 
negative and significant. The larger the value of AQ and 
PREDICT, the lower the earnings quality. Therefore, the results 
are consistent with a U-shaped curve between diversity-in-
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boards and earnings quality, similar to the earlier finding when 
examining the standardised aggregate earnings quality score as 
a dependent variable. However, W_DiB and its quadratic terms 
are not significant to PERSIS and SMOOTH. 
Alternative regression specifications 
This paper measures diversity-in-boards indices through the 
terciles split method which split the sample into terciles for 
each demographic attribute of board of directors to rank 
diversity levels (Ben-Amar et al. 2013; Hafsi and Turgut 2013). 
For a robustness check, this thesis measured diversity-in-boards 
indices using median and quartile values alternately to rank 
firms’ diversity levels. Specifically, the median split method 
categorized each demographic attribute into two groups, taking 
one if every value above the median, otherwise zero. The 
quartile split method categorized each demographic attribute 
into four groups, taking zero for the first quartile, one for the 
second quartile, two for the third quartile, and three for the 
fourth quartile. The results are similar to the main findings.  
Summary and concluding remarks 
This paper develops diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards 
indices (including both unweighted and weighted) and explores 
the relationship between board diversity and earnings quality 
measured by a standardised aggregate score compiled from four 
accounting-based measures of earnings quality of Vietnamese 
listed firms. We hypothesise that diversity-of-boards and 
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diversity-in-boards are positively associated with earnings 
quality (Hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively). The results are 
consistent with expectations for Hypothesis 1, but not for 
Hypothesis 2. Specifically, our findings suggest that diversity-
of-boards (using both weighted and unweighted indices) 
improves earnings quality. The diversity-in-boards (using both 
weighted and unweighted indices) is not linearly related to 
earnings quality, and results suggest a nonlinear relationship 
with a U-shaped curve between diversity-in-boards and 
earnings quality. 
We construct weighted diversity-of-boards and weighted 
diversity-in-boards indices to examine their influences to avoid 
treating attributes with equal importance when lumping 
attributes in diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards indices. 
There is no significant difference in the relation between board 
diversity and earnings quality using weighted and unweighted 
approaches to construct board diversity indices. We also 
conduct several other robustness checks to explore the 
robustness of our results, but our main findings and inferences 
are not affected. 
However, we acknowledge that the sample size may limit 
the generalizability of our results. This is because there must be 
7 years’ data available to measure accruals quality, while two 
Vietnamese stock exchanges, HOSE and HNX, were 
established in the years 2000 and 2005, respectively. Future 
35 
 
studies could explore a large-scale longitudinal analysis of our 
study.      
In spite of the limitations, this study makes contributions. 
First, this is the first concerted attempt to examine the impact of 
board diversity on the quality of earnings for a small and newly 
emerging market, Vietnam. Vietnam is one of the lowest 
ranked countries for protecting investors among the Southeast 
Asian countries (World Bank, 2013). The findings of this study 
assist Vietnamese policymakers in reviewing the implications 
of the current corporate governance codes about boards of 
directors in the context of Vietnam to increase firms’ reporting 
transparency and accountability to investors. It may also assist 
other emerging nations with a low level of investor protection 
but striving to improve corporate governance. Second, most 
previous studies on board diversity have focused on either 
demographic or structural attributes of boards of directors 
separately. The board diversity measure in this study uses a 
wide range of demographic and structural attributes to construct 
two different dimensions of board diversity, including 
diversity-of-boards and diversity-in-boards. This approach 
takes a broader view of board diversity impacts on earnings 
quality. Third, the design and development of board diversity 
indices (both weighted and unweighted) may help to advance 
ways of measuring board diversity. 
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Appendix. Method of measuring unweighted diversity-of-
boards index (UW_DoB) 
First, we measured the dissimilarity between a given firm and 
another firm, and we then measured such dissimilarity for all 
other firms, using a mathematical distance function defined by 





















where d(i, j) is a distance function (metric) used to express the 
(dis)similarity between two objects (firms) i and j; i and j are 
two p-dimensional data points represented as (xi1, xi2, …, xip) 
and (xj1, xj2, …, xjp) respectively; the indicator = 1 with the 
assumption that attributes f are equal weights to the relative 
contributions of each attribute f to the distance function. 
Then, the contribution of attribute f to the dissimilarity 
between i and j (i.e., ) is computed based on the data type of 
the attribute: 
a) If f is binary or categorical: = 0 if xif = xjf, or 
otherwise = 1; 
b) If f is interval scale: 
where h runs over all non-missing objects for attribute f; 
c) If f is ordinal: compute ranks rif and , 
































d) If f is ratio scale: either perform logarithmic 
transformation and treat the transformed data as interval 
scale; or treat f as continuous ordinal data, compute rif and 
zif, and then treat zif as interval scale; or treat ratio scale 
attributes like interval scale attributes. 
In this function, the contribution of dissimilarity all 
different attributes (i.e., ) are normalized, and hence 
expressed on a common scale of [0, 1]. Then, we take the 
average distance (dissimilarity) to all the other boards (we 
deduct 1 because we compare a firm with other firms without 












where n is the number of firm boards; D(i) is the average 
distance (dissimilarity) of firm board i to all other boards in the 
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Table 1 Description of the variables included in diversity indices) 
Variables  Measurement  
Included variables in diversity-of-boards indices 
CEO/chair separation 0 if the chairperson also serves as the CEO 
and 1 otherwise. 
Non-executive directors 
owning more than 5% of a 
firm’s equity 
(blockholders) 
1 if there is more than one non-executive 




The percentage of state ownership represented 
by directors. 
Promoters The number of inside directors also serves as 
representative directors for government 
divided by total number of directors on the 
board of directors. 
Included variables in diversity-in-boards indices 
Director gender Using modified Blau’s index with a 
classification of male and female directors 
Director age Using modified Blau’s index with a 
classification of five subgroupings: under 36 
years, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and over 65 
Director education degree Using modified Blau’s index with a 
classification of four subgroupings: PhD, 
master’s, bachelor’s and others 
Director nationality Using modified Blau’s index with a 







Table 2 Descriptive statistics for importance rating based on 
industry executives’ responses 
Importance rating Max Min Mean SD 
Structural attributes     
CEO/chair serperation 10 3 8.2 1.22 
% Representative directors’ ownership 10 6 7.8 1.08 
% Promoters  10 6 8.5 1.19 
Non-executive directors owning > 5% of a 
firm’s equity  9 3 7.1 1.73 
Demographic attributes 
    Gender diversity in board of directors 7 0 4.3 2.35 
Age diversity in board of directors 8 0 5.6 2.32 
Education degree diversity in board of directors 8 3 6 1.36 





Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Max Min Mean SD 
Dependent variables 
EQ 126.50 1.00 75.50 27.65 
Four earnings attributes to construct the aggregate earnings quality score 
AQ 0.4 0.001 0.06 0.06 
PERSIS 4.78 -2.8 -0.44 0.86 
PREDICT 0.4 0.01 0.07 0.08 
SMOOTH 2.65 0.03 0.49 0.45 
Independent variables 
UW_DoB 0.49 0.23 0.31 0.07 
W_DoB 0.51 0.23 0.31 0.07 
UW_DiB 7.00 0.00 2.91 1.69 
W_DiB 41.20 0.00 16.11 9.71 
Structural attributes of board of directors to construct DoB_Index 
CEO/chair seperation 1 0 0.61 0.49 
% Representative directors’ ownership  0.79 0 0.22 0.23 
% Promoters 0.86 0 0.13 0.2 
Non-executive directors owning > 5% of a 
firm’s equity  1 0 0.14 0.35 
Demographic attributes of board of directors measured by the modified 
Blau’s index to construct DiB_Index 
Gender diversity in board of directors 0.98 0.00 0.39 0.38 
Age diversity in board of directors 0.92 0.00 0.64 0.20 
Education degree diversity in board of 
directors 0.93 0.00 0.38 0.27 
Nationality diversity in board of directors 1.00 0.00 0.08 0.23 
Control variables 
    SIZE 7.24 4.36 5.69 0.62 
STD.CFO 0.77 0.02 0.16 0.11 
STD.SALES 2.33 0.02 0.38 0.42 
LOG.OC 3.37 1.07 2.15 0.38 
LOSS 3 0 0.25 0.6 
STATE 1.00 0.00 0.51 0.50 
This table shows summary statistics for variables used in this paper. The 
final sample consists of 150 firms listed on HOSE and HNX, each with a 
continuous listing history over the entire period from 2005 to 2011 for the 
2010 sample. EQ is the firm-specific standardised aggregate earnings 
quality score; AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT and SMOOTH are firm-specific 
accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings 
smoothness values, respectively; UW_DoB and W_DoB are unweighted 
and weighted diversity-of-boards indices respectively; UW_DiB and 
W_DiB are unweighted and weighted diversity-in-boards indices 
respectively; SIZE is firm size; STD.CFO is cash flow variability; 
STD.SALES is sales variability; LOG.OC is length of operating cycle; 








Table 4 Correlation matrix 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 AQ 1.000 
              
2 PERSIS 0.394 1.000 
             
3 PREDICT 0.666 0.390 1.000 
            
4 SMOOTH 0.618 0.317 0.771 1.000 
           
5 EQ -0.520 -0.422 -0.585 -0.566 1.000 
          
6 UW_DoB -0.120 -0.160 -0.144 -0.191 0.151 1.000 
         
7 W_DoB -0.123 -0.176 -0.156 -0.194 0.167 0.987 1.000 
        
8 UW_DiB 0.120 -0.013 0.044 -0.010 -0.134 -0.058 -0.100 1.000 
       
9 W_DiB 0.113 -0.018 0.036 -0.014 -0.132 -0.069 -0.110 0.986 1.000 
      
10 SIZE 0.028 -0.075 0.044 -0.028 -0.002 0.160 0.194 0.147 0.193 1.000 
     
11 STD.CFO 0.112 0.060 0.169 -0.200 0.003 -0.038 -0.032 -0.019 -0.026 -0.064 1.000 
    
12 STD.SALES 0.009 -0.060 -0.033 -0.141 0.026 -0.136 -0.128 0.026 0.024 -0.025 0.278 1.000 
   
13 OPCYCLE -0.187 -0.140 -0.102 -0.063 0.224 0.011 -0.012 0.118 0.115 0.108 -0.164 -0.439 1.000 
  
14 LOSS -0.020 0.034 0.130 0.039 -0.200 -0.113 -0.117 0.115 0.103 0.017 0.022 -0.040 -0.033 1.000 
 
15 STATE -0.148 0.001 -0.221 -0.161 0.164 0.027 0.109 -0.390 -0.403 -0.087 0.039 -0.040 -0.125 -0.130 1.000 




Table 5 Board diversity (unweighted and weighted indices) and 
earnings quality 
 
Dependent Variable EQ EQ EQ EQ 
UW_DoB 59.67* 
   
 
(0.055) 
   
W_DoB  67.77**   
  (0.040)   
UW_DiB   -1.63  
   (0.256)  
W_DiB    -0.28 
    (0.274) 
SIZE -1.76 -2.174 -0.08 0.10 
 
(0.603) (0.521) (0.981) (0.978) 
STD.CFO 0.82 0.72 1.18 1.11 
 
(0.966) (0.970) (0.951) (0.954) 
STD.SALES 12.77** 12.831** 11.27** 11.20** 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.033) (0.034) 
LOG.OC 24.20*** 24.45*** 23.84*** 23.72*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS -6.37* -6.351* -6.95* -7.03** 
 
(0.083) (0.082) (0.051) (0.048) 
STATE 23.48** 21.67** 19.15* 19.12* 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.081) (0.086) 
Constant 5.22 4.963 21.54 20.52 
 
(0.839) (0.846) (0.383) (0.407) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.120 0.123 0.104 0.103 
F statistic 4.02*** 4.10*** 4.11*** 4.08*** 
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.14 1.15 1.18 1.18 
The p-values are in parentheses, calculated using standard errors corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * 









EQ EQ EQ EQ 
UW_DoB 172.65    
 
(0.558)    
UW_DoB
2 
˗164.72    
 (0.699)    
W_DoB  1.26   
  (0.997)   
W_DoB
2 
 98.36   
  (0.818)   
UW_DiB   ˗8.97**  
   (0.017)  
UW_DiB
2 
  1.18**  
   (0.040)  
W_DiB    ˗1.44** 
 
   (0.023) 
W_DiB
2 
   0.03** 
 
   (0.043) 
SIZE ˗1.75 ˗2.29 ˗0.18 ˗0.06 
 
(0.606) (0.505) (0.960) (0.987) 
STD.CFO 0.91 0.64 4.71 4.46 
 
(0.962) (0.973) (0.807) (0.817) 
STD.SALES 12.64** 12.90** 11.39** 11.05** 
 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.033) (0.038) 
LOG.OC 24.23*** 24.50*** 23.55*** 23.55*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOSS ˗6.42* ˗6.34* ˗6.82* ˗6.78* 
 
(0.084) (0.081) (0.059) (0.061) 
STATE 22.73** 21.67** 19.06* 19.33* 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.080) (0.080) 
Constant ˗12.96 16.19 30.13 28.22 
 
(0.819) (0.782) (0.224) (0.258) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.115 0.117 0.119 0.115 
F statistic 3.50*** 3.80*** 4.18*** 4.06*** 
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
The p-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, 




Table 7 Board diversity and individual earnings attribute measures  
  Panel A: Diversity-of-boards and individual EQ measures Panel B: Diversity-in-boards and individual EQ measures Panel C: Nonlinearity and diversity-in-boards 
  AQ PERSIS PREDICT SMOOTH AQ PERSIS PREDICT SMOOTH AQ PERSIS PREDICT SMOOTH 
W_DoB -0.133* -2.463** -0.173** -1.473*** 
        
 
(0.077) (0.020) (0.032) (0.001) 
        W_DiB 
    
0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.0034** -0.0160 0.0034* 0.0102 
     
(0.230) (0.933) (0.367) (0.416) (0.023) (0.505) (0.093) (0.481) 
W_DiB2 
        
-0.0001* 0.0005 -0.0001** -0.0004 
         
(0.093) (0.462) (0.039) (0.263) 
SIZE 0.010 -0.020 0.014 0.006 0.004 -0.080 0.010 -0.021 0.0047 -0.0822 0.0106 -0.0194 
 
(0.186) (0.864) (0.215) (0.927) (0.609) (0.467) (0.372) (0.729) (0.579) (0.486) (0.340) (0.751) 
STD.CFO 0.059 0.559 0.137** -1.083*** 0.092 0.541 0.183* -1.096*** 0.0841 0.5891 0.1709* -1.1348*** 
 
(0.155) (0.379) (0.046) (0.000) (0.203) (0.327) (0.068) (0.001) (0.228) (0.366) (0.078) (0.000) 
STD.SALES -0.022 -0.423** -0.030** -0.217** -0.032 -0.353 -0.042 -0.171** -0.0314 -0.3550* -0.0419 -0.1695** 
 
(0.110) (0.032) (0.049) (0.012) (0.182) (0.116) (0.144) (0.040) (0.183) (0.073) (0.145) (0.043) 
LOG.OC -0.048*** -0.504** -0.033* -0.231** -0.061** -0.460* -0.048 -0.197* -0.0611** -0.4623** -0.0476 -0.1951** 
 
(0.003) (0.017) (0.078) (0.022) (0.022) (0.059) (0.143) (0.046) (0.022) (0.032) (0.144) (0.049) 
LOSS -0.007 -0.013 0.017* 0.009 -0.010 0.021 0.015 0.032 -0.0103 0.0243 0.0137 0.0295 
 
(0.375) (0.914) (0.058) (0.856) (0.313) (0.821) (0.215) (0.483) (0.295) (0.839) (0.254) (0.528) 
STATE -0.050** -0.071 -0.079*** -0.305* -0.064 -0.132 -0.128** -0.404** -0.0649 -0.1293 -0.1286** -0.4061** 
 
(0.041) (0.827) (0.009) (0.052) (0.191) (0.746) (0.040) (0.034) (0.189) (0.717) (0.039) (0.033) 
55 
 
Constant 0.160** 1.616* 0.120 1.742*** 0.176* 1.072 0.150 1.425*** 0.1583* 1.1816 0.1232 1.3345*** 
 
(0.031) (0.055) (0.104) (0.000) (0.075) (0.240) (0.213) (0.001) (0.086) (0.159) (0.281) (0.004) 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.038 0.127 0.153 0.055 0.000 0.083 0.108 0.058 -0.003 0.093 0.111 
F statistic 2.37** 1.84* 4.56*** 6.50*** 2.37** 1.01 3.47*** 4.92*** 2.08** 0.95 2.90*** 4.46*** 
p-value 0.025 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.430 0.002 0.000 0.041 0.481 0.005 0.000 
The p-values are in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In the Vietnamese listed firms, the concept of outside and inside directors has not been clarified and practiced yet. Presently, just only non-executive directors are defined as 
outside/independent directors and executive directors are considered inside directors. 
2
 Gaio and Raposo (2011) used a 6-year rolling windows instead of a 14-year rolling windows to compute earnings quality measures and reported similar results. 
3
 For validity purposes, this study also used four individual earnings attribute measures (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability and earnings 
smoothness) instead of the standardised aggregate earnings quality score in the robustness tests. 
4
 The survey was carried out in accordance with Ethical Requirements for Research with Low Risk, and this study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee. 
5
 Because almost identical results are obtained by using either unweighted or weighted index, for brevity, this paper only presents results using unweighted index of diversity-
in-boards. Other results are available upon request. 
